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Abstract 
 
Numerous studies observe a decrease in environmental crimes following imposition of 
fines or penalties potentially due to general and specific deterrent effects. Here we 
explore whether those deterrent effects appear plausible by estimating the probability of 
a USEPA criminal case occurring each year between 1983 through 2013. Our analysis 
shows that there is an extremely low probability of an environmental crime case being 
prosecuted criminally by USEPA, casting doubt that these criminal cases are sufficiently 
widespread to generate a deterrent effect. We suggested that alternative theoretical 
orientations and policy initiatives be employed in studying and responding to 
environmental infractions.  
 
  
	3	
Introduction 
 Criminological, economic, and other behavioral theories, as well as regulatory 
policy, suggest that environmental crime can be controlled through the detection and 
sanctioning process that deters offenders (Beccaria 1764; Becker 1968; Bentham 1879; 
Posner 1985). With respect to sanctions, it is widely hypothesized that the more severe 
the sanction, the greater the deterrent effect the sanction should pose. Moreover, for the 
purpose of deterrence, criminal sanctions for environmental crimes ought to be 
preferred over other options, and ought to work more efficiently than other forms of 
sanctions (except see DeLong 2002 and O’Hear 2004). Illustrating this point, on its 
compliance page, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (2013) states: 
EPA’s criminal enforcement authorities provide EPA’s strongest sanctions 
against polluters. Criminal penalties, with potential prison time as well as 
monetary fines, are critical to deter potential violators, eliminate the 
temptation for companies to “pay to pollute” and implement the felony 
provisions of our nation’s environmental 
laws. 
 
To facilitate criminal enforcement at the federal level nationwide, the USEPA employs 
200 criminal investigators or special agents, and approximately another 150 scientists, 
lawyers, engineers, and other technical agents to work on criminal investigations of 
criminal environmental violations (USEPA 2013). This is not a large staff, especially 
given the number of federal laws this staff investigates, and the geographic scope of 
coverage of the USEPA. With respect to the availability of enforcement staff, for 
example, consider that New York State’s Department of Environmental Conservation 
alone employs 241 environmental conservation officers to investigate and enforce 
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environmental laws (NYS DEP 2013), one can therefore surmise that the USEPA 
appears understaffed. 
 Numerous studies of the deterrent effects of criminal environmental sanctioning 
have been undertaken. These studies include those that examine criminal fines as well 
as other criminal penalties to explore the assumption that criminal sanctions deter 
environmental offenders (see below). In theory, rational offenders are deterred from 
crime when the costs of crime outweigh its rewards (Beccaria 1764; Becker 1968; 
Bentham 1879). Those costs may be applied directly to offenders (specific deterrence), 
or indirectly to potential offenders through their observation of environmental social 
control responses applied to actual offenders (general deterrence). Many studies 
exploring the deterrent effects of environmental sanctions find that criminal sanctions 
significantly deter both penalized as well as non-penalized facilities. In many studies, 
the effects discovered for criminal penalties appear quite large, and empirical results 
from these studies suggest that those penalties possess the ability to reduce offending 
substantially. 
 However, because criminal punishments are rarely used to control environmental 
crime, few offenders are actually punished criminally. As a result, the likelihood of 
criminal punishment remains low, and this begs the question of why criminal penalties 
would deter rational offenders when the probability of criminal prosecution is quite low. 
Rather, it would seem that rational offenders, perceiving that the probability of 
environmental punishment is low, would engage in a larger volume of environmental 
offenses. 
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 To examine these issues the present study addresses a question that has yet to 
be fully explored in the criminological literature on criminal penalties for environmental 
offenses: What is the probability that any particular firm policed by the USEPA will 
receive a criminal penalty? To address this issue, we analyze data on USEPA criminal 
prosecutions from 1983 through 2013 available from the USEPA on its website. We use 
estimates of the probability of criminal prosecution to address whether the likelihood of 
criminal prosecution appears large enough to change the behavior of rational corporate 
offenders. 
 We begin our discussion with a brief review of prior research on deterrence and 
environmental crime designed primarily to illustrate potential flaws in that literature that 
lead to the over-estimation of the deterrent effect of environmental penalties. Following 
that review, we examine the context in which the USEPA endeavors to promote 
deterrence by examining the number of firms subject to USEPA activities, and then 
examine probabilities of criminal case filing against those firms annually for the time 
period 1983–2013. The estimation of the probability of a criminal case being filed 
measures an important aspect of the likelihood that criminal sanctions will deter 
environmental crimes that has not been addressed in prior studies. 
 
Empirical assessments of deterrence and environmental crime 
 Research on the deterrent effects of environmental enforcement has produced 
mixed results. Whether or not researchers discover a deterrent effect for environmental 
social control depends on how deterrence is specified, the penalty examined, the units 
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of analysis employed, the industry and/or specific law examined, and the time period 
and nation from which the data is drawn (see details below). Studies of environmental 
deterrence do not employ standard measures or metrics for deterrence, making it 
difficult to compare studies and to generalize study results. Sometimes, deterrent 
effects are noted for specific laws and not others, which again limits the generalizability 
of environmental social control deterrence research. 
 Environmental crime literature reviews tend to highlight deterrence-oriented 
research that supports specific and general deterrence hypotheses (e.g., Gray and 
Shimshack 2011). Such reviews may have a limited scope and primarily have 
addressed the deterrence-environmental crime association in economics and public 
policy literature. Omitted from such literature reviews of deterrence and environmental 
crime are criminological studies that have rejected deterrence based arguments (e.g., 
Braithwaite and Makkai 1991; Makkai and Braithwaite 1994; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 
2013; Long at al. 2012; Stretesky and Lynch 2009, 2011; Weisburd, Waring, and 
Chayet 1995). When such studies are considered, support for deterrence-based 
environmental crime hypotheses is weakened. Below, we draw attention to studies that 
support and reject certain aspects of deterrence based arguments for environmental 
crime. 
 Theoretically, studies of deterrence assume that rationally calculating 
corporations can be deterred by financial penalties that affect their bottom line (for 
critical assessment of these assumptions and an empirical study testing these 
assumptions see Stafford 2006). In theory, when penalties exceed the rewards of an 
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environmental crime, the offense should be deterred. This general assumption is 
complicated by issues related to the perception of rewards and punishments by 
potential offenders (Earnhart and Friesen 2013; Friesen 2012). In more general terms, 
criminologists have found inconsistent evidence with respect to deterrence across a 
wide variety of crimes, and literature reviews on this issue performed decades apart 
indicate that the effect of punishment on crime is, at best, small (Paternoster 1987, 
1989, 2010). 
 In addition to empirical criticism, one can also critique the theoretical premise of 
deterrence (Paternoster 2010). It is difficult, for example, to separate deterrent effects 
from other effects that may also cause crime to decline (Paternoster 1987, 2010). With 
respect to the study of deterrence among environmental offenders, other issues must 
also be considered. For example, one of the problematic aspects of studies of 
deterrence and environmental crime is that penalty rates are low among samples of 
environmental offenders, and, as with any study of crime that employs official offending 
data, suffers from under-reporting of offending. It is highly unlikely that given the small 
number of criminal sanctions for environmental offenders and the potential extent of 
undiscovered and unreported corporate environmental offenses, that the real deterrent 
effects of criminal penalties can be determined from extant literature. Because criminal 
penalties for environmental offenses are rare, prior estimates of the deterrent effects of 
criminal penalties on environmental offenders are likely to be quite sensitive to missing 
cases, while environmental data is likely to under-report environmental offenses 
(Bennear 2008; de Marchi and Hamilton 2006; Lynch, Stretesky, and Hammond 2000). 
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Bennear (2006), for example, found that several factors affected self-reporting of 
environmental offenses, and that changes in environmental laws over time also reduced 
the number of reportable offenses that could produce the appearance of a decline in 
environmental crime over time. Moreover, given that criminal environmental sanctions 
are rare and may vary by the type of offense examined or even the location of 
environmental crimes, it becomes difficult to generalize from deterrence research on 
environmental crime. 
 Nevertheless, in the literature there are several studies that support 
environmental social control deterrence hypotheses. Shimshack and Ward (2005), for 
instance, discovered a rather large deterrence effect that has been well cited in the 
literature as an example of the deterrent effects associated with financial penalties for 
environmental crimes. Shimshack and Ward examined the impact of environmental 
enforcement spillover effects—that is the deterrent effect of fines on non-fined 
companies—for water pollution violations generated by financial penalties. Their results 
suggest that non-fined companies reduce their violation rates by two thirds following the 
fining of an offending company. This empirical result is large, and if correct and 
generalizable, indicates that fines ought to play a significant role in the reduction of 
water pollution violations. 
 The effect noted by Shimshack and Ward relates to general deterrence, or the 
idea that a penalty changes the behavior of potential violators (even though the penalty 
was applied to an actual—not potential—offender). In a recent study, Earnhart and 
Friesen (2013) employed an experimental scenario design to assess the assumptions of 
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this general deterrence argument. In contrast to general deterrence expectations, 
Earnhart and Friesen found an “experiential” effect—or what is more generally called a 
specific deterrence effect—that a punishment changes the behavior of those to whom it 
is applied more than it changes the behavior of potential offenders. Similarly, Harrington 
(2013) found that certain environmental policy goals are only met when companies that 
violate environmental regulations are subject to high levels of environmental 
enforcement. 
 How does one explain the large effect shown in Shimshack and Ward’s analysis? 
One possible explanation is that actors in non-offending companies have knowledge of 
environmental penalties and endeavor to maintain compliance in response to fines 
issued to offending corporations. That issue was specifically examined by Thornton, 
Gunningham, and Kagan (2005). In their study, Thornton and colleagues asked 
corporate decision makers about their knowledge and responses to environmental 
penalties levied against other facilities. They found that 63% of facility respondents 
reported taking some compliance action related to knowledge of an environmental 
action taken against other firms. Only 42% of respondents, however, reported being 
aware of “signal” or important fines levied against other facilities. This may mean that 
the respondents over-generalized from penalties against other firms. More importantly, 
these findings do not suggest that knowledge of non-compliance penalties affect firms 
that are in non-compliance. Rather, it was found that firms already in compliance were 
more likely to enhance their compliance routines when other firms are penalized. Thus, 
it appears that fines do not generally have important consequences for firms that are in 
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states of non-compliance, but rather, enhance conformity among firms that already 
adhere to environmental regulations. 
 One of the assumptions of deterrence based arguments related to environmental 
fines is that there is an optimal fine that can be identified that will generate the largest 
deterrent effect. In exploring this issue with respect to pollution emissions, Rousseau 
and Telle (2010) found that they were unable to accurately predict an optimal fine 
amount because fine amounts are nonlinear and produce different responses over the 
range of the response curve. In addition, the authors’ research suggests that there is an 
unexplained interaction between fine amounts, emission levels and economic 
production. Thus, while fines may generate some deterrence, it is unclear how large a 
fine must be to generate deterrence or to produce an optimal effect, and how other 
factors interact to affect compliance. 
 As noted above, one of the problems when studying environmental deterrence is 
that the behavior of all facilities is an unknown. The available data only records known 
violations, and there may be unknown violators among the sample population. It is, 
therefore, not possible to accurately estimate deterrence effects for all facilities since 
some portion of the facilities assumed to be in compliance may actually be in 
noncompliance because their infractions are unknown to regulators. In order to 
accurately know whether or not firms change their behavior following a fine, the data 
must be 100% valid. Any missing cases increases the estimate of the deterrent effect 
unless the process of discovering violations is the result of a random inspection and 
discovery process, in which case the violation rate among the inspected and 
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uninspected facilities should be equivalent. Thus, it would appear that the only way to 
know about the deterrent effects of fines would be to use a randomized experimental 
method. Unless such a method is employed, facilities have different probabilities of 
being selected for inspection and discovery of violations, which biases the estimate of 
the deterrent effect. 
 The general assumptions of deterrence theory are specified as invariant across 
individual firms and their decision makers. That is to say, the assumption behind 
deterrence theory is that a penalty that is greater than the reward from a crime always 
results in deterrence because economic actors are rational and behave in a similar way. 
In a recent experimental study, this assumption was tested by Friesen (2012). Friesen 
examined whether a penalty would always change the behavior of potential offenders in 
the expected direction. To do so, she identified corporate actors in the study as risk-
averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving. Friesen hypothesized that the effects of penalties 
would vary across these groups because each had a different level of risk aversion. For 
example, Friesen hypothesized that an increase in the probability of detection along 
with a decline in penalties would lead some risk-averters to switch from compliance to a 
violation, while risk-neutral and risk-lovers would continue to violate the law. In 
assessing respondents’ risk position, Friesen found that 83% were risk averse, 13% 
were risk neutral, and that 4% were risk lovers. In multivariate tests, she confirmed the 
above hypothesis concerning increased risk of detection when penalties declined, and 
found that the effect of increasing fines had a larger impact than increasing the 
likelihood of detection. The outcome, however, varied across risk position, and indicated 
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that the effects of deterrence were not uniform across experimental firm respondents. 
Our interpretation of these results is that the likelihood of deterrence occurring is 
variable across firms, and the combination of the likelihood of detection and penalties 
interact with firm risk position to affect the likelihood of deterrence. In other words, not 
all firms are deterred by the same conditions. This implies that the more general 
assumption of deterrence theory related to uniformity in response to conditions that 
ought to generate deterrence, do not necessarily exist. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
fines is conditioned by the risk of detection, so that increasing one or the other may not 
generate significantly more deterrence. Banerjee, Iyer, and Kashyap (2003) observed 
differences across industries with respect to a firm’s environmental orientation and 
environmental strategy. They discovered that regulatory forces appear antecedent to 
management’s perceived relationship between environmental issues and financial 
health in industries with high environmental impact (measured as pharmaceutical, utility, 
chemical, and manufacturing industries), but not among industries with moderate 
environmental impact (measured as service, consumer products, and food industries). 
Variability in penalty applications and penalty structures as well as variability in the 
certainty of detection may help explain why studies sometimes find or reject deterrence 
hypotheses. In order to act as a deterrent, environmental penalties must have certain 
features that facilitate rational decision making on behalf of potential offenders. One of 
those features is the predictability of environmental penalties. In an article that 
addresses these issues, Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) found that “legal penalties are 
idiosyncratic and difficult to predict” (p. 654). Other research indicates that 
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environmental decision making is impacted by size of a corporation, and that larger 
corporations are more difficult to deter (Gunningham, Thornton, and Kagin 2005). 
 Other studies suggest that factors beyond the forms of deterrence associated 
with the enforcement of environmental statues matter more in controlling corporate 
environmental offending. In a 2003 study, Kagin, Gunningham, and Thornton found that 
a number of factors have effects on environmental compliance in the paper pulp sector. 
These factors included political pressure and tightened regulations, but also included 
pressure from local communities and environmental organizations. Kagin and 
colleagues argue that the effects of environmental law and regulation eclipses 
traditional instrumental impacts such as deterrence to include interactions between 
environmental compliance and social pressures (see also, Gunnington, Kagin, and 
Thornton 2004). Similar arguments have been applied to other environmental issues of 
compliance (Hauck 2008). 
 Support for deterrence arguments have also been found in studies in various 
nations. Almer and Goeschi (2010) suggest that criminal punishments for environmental 
crime produce deterrent effects across German states. Their analysis shows an effect 
for imprisonment, although no effect for convictions, meaning that only the most serious 
social control response produced a deterrent effect. Imprisonment, however, is a rare 
response for environmental crime, indicating that while such an effect may have a 
significant deterrent effect, such an effect is unlikely to occur given the rarity of 
sentences of imprisonment for environmental offenders (see also, Billet and Rousseau 
2011). Telle (2009) found that the threat of inspections reduced serious environmental 
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violations but not emissions in a study of Norwegian corporations. International studies 
have drawn attention to the effect of innovations in monitoring environmental 
compliance and offenses including poaching of wildlife (Smith, Adhern, and McDougal 
1998). One example is the use of satellite surveillance in monitoring deforestation. In 
their study on deforestation and the use of satellite surveillance in Brazil, Assunção, 
Gandour, and Rocha (2013) found that this new technology and its combination with a 
system of fines reduced deforestation crimes by 75%.  
 
Probabilities of detection 
 Above we reviewed some of the studies on deterrence and environmental crime. 
While the results in that literature are mixed, it is fair to say that the evidence appears to 
often be interpreted as favoring deterrence based hypotheses. At the same time, the 
extant literature has several limitations which should lead researchers to be cautious 
concerning reaching conclusion about the extent to which environmental social control 
deters environmental crime. One of the limitations of deterrence based research has 
been its failure to address whether one of its central assumptions, the probability of 
detection and punishment, appears large enough or sufficient to generate deterrence. 
This assumption has been addressed with respect to perceptions of deterrence via the 
use of surveys (e.g., Earnhart and Friesen 2013; Friesen 2012). Survey research with 
corporate respondents appears to suggest that corporate actors are likely to respond to 
the punishment of corporate violators by improving compliance. What such surveys and 
other studies have neglected, however, is whether the real probability of enforcement is 
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logically sufficient to maintain deterrence, and whether enforcement is mathematically 
sufficient to generate the volume of deterrence prior studies have identified as 
occurring. Criminological research on corporate and environmental crime has shown 
that the actual level of punishment of corporate offenders is quite low (Reiman and 
Leighton 2010; Friedrichs 2009). In the empirical literature, the deterrent effects 
attributed to environmental punishment are, in contrast, quite high. Based on perceptual 
studies and survey research, this would mean that the perception of punishment for 
environmental violations must be extraordinarily high to explain the difference between 
the actual level of environmental punishment and its deterrent impacts. If this is true, 
then this outcome contradicts one of the central assumptions of deterrence theory—that 
actors behave rationally. 
 Prior studies have identified a similar problem called the “Harrington Paradox” 
(Harrington 1988). The Harrington Paradox notes that despite violations of the 
assumptions of deterrence theory (low levels of punishment), corporations nevertheless 
adhere to environmental law. Specifically, Harrington argued that three factors that 
appear in environmental enforcement contradict the assumptions of deterrence theory. 
First, the likelihood of official monitoring of environmental compliance is low. Second, if 
a violation is detected, the likelihood of punishment is low. Third, in comparison to the 
costs of environmental compliance, the costs of penalties are low. Given these three 
conditions and based on the assumptions of deterrence theory, rational corporate actors 
should prefer offending over compliance if the deterrence argument is correct. Recent 
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studies suggest that additional attention to this issue is required (Nyborg and Telle 
2006). 
 To illustrate this dilemma, below we examine an estimation of the probability of 
enforcement by examining the likelihood of a criminal penalty being imposed by the 
USEPA for each year of activity from 1983–2013. The question we address is whether 
the probability of criminal enforcement appears sufficient in the context of the 
assumption of rational offenders included within deterrence hypotheses. Based on the 
premises of deterrence theory, we assume that rational offenders have knowledge of 
the probability of detection and the likelihood that criminal penalties result. Following the 
deterrence argument, if the real probability of detection and punishment is low, then one 
would expect that rational actors would be quite likely to violate the law precisely 
because the probability of punishment and the consequences of punishment are small. 
If, however, the probability of punishment is low and yet a large number of corporations 
refrain from committing environmental crimes as the extant literature suggests, then the 
theoretical explanation of the effect of environmental punishment on corporate behavior 
requires modification because corporate actors are not behaving rationally. Absent the 
central assumption of a rational actor, it is unclear why corporate actors adhere to law 
from a deterrence perspective. 
 In the section that follows, we take up an estimation of the probability of detection 
of corporate environmental offending employing USEPA data on environmental 
punishment. We make no assumption about the volume of offending and believe such 
an estimation cannot be made because USEPA estimates of offending suffer from 
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under-reporting. Studies of official street crime data have long illustrated that the volume 
of offending is significantly higher than police/official data indicate (Pepper, Petrie, and 
Sullivan 2010; Mosher, Miethe, and Hart 2010). Few studies of this issue appear in the 
environmental crime literature. Extant literature suggests, however, under-reporting by 
corporations of self-reported offending of environmental violations (Environmental 
Integrity Project & Galvaston-Houston Association for Smog Prevention 2004; Telle 
2013; U.S. General Accounting Office 2001). 
 
Estimating the probability of detection, Part I: Effect estimates from prior studies 
and USEPA staff/offender ratios 
 
 In order to determine the probability of detection for an environmental offense, it 
is first necessary to estimate the population of potential offenders. Potential offenders 
include all firms/companies the USEPA regulates. In its most recent survey of 
employers, the U.S. Census Bureau’s Department of Commerce indicates that in 2008, 
there were 5,930,132 “employer firms” (i.e., firms with payroll employees) in the United 
States (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). Of those firms, 2,312,368 have five or more 
employees. We note this outcome since some federal reporting requirements for 
environmental data are restricted to companies with five or more employees, and hence 
we assume that these firms are most likely to be policed/investigated by the USEPA. If 
we assume that these 2,312,368 firms operate, on average, 5.5 days per week, that’s 
an average of 286 days of operation per firm per year, or a total of 661,337,248 total 
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business days for all firms annually. Earlier, we noted that the USEPA employs 
approximately 200 criminal investigators to examine environmental offenses. This 
means that for 2.312 million firms with five or more employees there is one criminal 
investigator for every 11,562 firms. With respect to business days, there is one 
investigator per 3,306,686 business days of operation. These figures already indicate 
that the volume of potential offenders will be difficult to surveil, especially since they are 
distributed across the 50 states. To contextualize the figures presented above, we 
compared the investigator/firm ratio to a detective/citizen ratio. We employ New York 
City for this comparison. New York City employs about 5,400 detectives to investigate 
criminal offenses among its population of 8.337 million. Since about 964,000 of those 
New York City residents are below the age of 10 and unlikely to be involved in crime, 
they can be eliminated as persons who are typically investigated by detectives (just as 
we eliminated businesses with fewer than five employees from the firm count). Thus, in 
New York City there is one detective per 1,365 people over the age of 10, or about 8.5 
times as many investigators per 100,000 population for street crimes in New York City 
as the USEPA has available to investigate environmental crime (per 100,000 firms) 
across the United States. These data indicate that relative to efforts to control and 
detect street crime, environmental crime investigation staffs are significantly smaller. 
Thus, one would expect that given the reduced probability of detection and investigation 
for environmental crimes, the deterrent effects of environmental crime enforcement 
might be less than for street crime enforcement. Police elasticity effects for crime are 
rather small and in general, a 10% increase in police presence produces a reduction in 
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crime of less than 3% (for discussion see, Kovandzic and Sloan 2002, who found an 
effect of 1.4%). 
 Prior research on the deterrent effects of environmental enforcement on 
environmental compliance demonstrate varied results, but indicate that the deterrent 
effect of enforcement is generally higher than those found for street crime. Nadeau’s 
(1997) study of noncompliance among pulp/paper plants (1979–1989) indicated that a 
10% increase in the threat of enforcement increased compliance by 4–5%. Deily and 
Gray (2007) and Gray and Deily (1996) discovered significant enforcement effects for 
steel mill compliance with environmental regulations. Specifically, Deily and Gray 
discovered that an enforcement action at a steel mill plant increased compliance by 
33%. Studying paper mills, Gray and Shadbegien (2005) found that an enforcement 
action at a plant increased compliance by 10%. Other studies find deterrent effects for 
specific activities such inspections (Magat and Viscusi 1990; for additional studies and 
results see, Gray and Shimshack 2011). 
 The very large deterrent effects discovered above seem implausible given what 
is known about corporate crime in general. Regulatory violations among corporations 
are widespread (Baucus and Near 1991), a fact that has been known since Sutherland 
first examined the behavior of corporations with respect to regulatory violations and 
published those results in the later 1930s and 1940s. Studies indicate that non-
compliance is significantly higher among large firms (Baucus and Near 1991) meaning 
that there may be significant variability in the effect of deterrence across businesses by 
size (for discussion of limitations of measurements of environmental crime data see 
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Burns, Lynch, and Stretesky 2008; Gibbs and Simpson 2009, who specifically note that 
the “real world” data outcomes appear “confusing,” pp. 103–105). 
 While the results from some prior studies may show a statistically significant 
deterrent effect for environmental enforcement, those studies have failed to address the 
policy related implications of those results with respect to the actual increase in 
punishment needed to reduce crime extrapolated from those estimates. For example, if 
as some previous studies suggest, a 10% increase in the threat of environmental 
enforcement increases compliance between 4–5%, then tremendous changes must be 
made in environmental criminal enforcement to reduce the volume of environmental 
crime. Assuming a very low rate (20%) of environmental offending among corporations 
and a USEPA rate of 1 enforcement agent per 11,562 firms, USEPA agent employment 
would need to increase by a factor of 4 (300%) to lead to a decline in environmental 
crime of about 54%. Those additional enforcement cases would, of course, require the 
expansion of other personnel in the criminal process, such as judges, attorneys, 
chemists, lab technicians, and so on to handle the additional case load. The financial 
costs of such as approach, therefore, would be substantial. 
 
Estimating the probability of deterrence Part II: EPA data on criminal enforcement 
case ratios 
 
 Having demonstrated that there is less environmental enforcement than street 
crime enforcement yet more deterrence associated with environmental enforcement 
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than street crime enforcement, we turn to additional examinations of the probability of 
environmental deterrence. To do so, in this section we examine the probability of a 
criminal case filing for an environmental crime relative to the potential number of 
offenders (i.e., corporations). Table 1 shows the number of criminal enforcement cases 
filed by the USEPA from 1983–2013 for more than twenty federal statutes. While that 
table includes twenty offense categories, one category “other” includes a variety of 
miscellaneous federal laws under which USEPA criminal actions have been filed. Thus, 
the number of laws enforced by the USEPA is substantially more than 20. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 What Table 1 displays over time is minimal criminal enforcement activity by the 
USEPA—that is, a relatively small number of criminal case filings. From 1983–2013, or 
over 31 years, the USEPA completed only 583 criminal enforcement cases according to 
its website. That is an average of 18.8 cases per year spread out over more than 20 
statutes and 50 states. Stated differently, that is an average of 0.94 cases per year/per 
regulation, or an average of 0.0188 cases per year/per regulation/ per state. Moreover, 
as indicated in Table 1, there are five federal laws listed for which there has never been 
a completed criminal case, and seven additional laws for which the total number of 
criminal prosecutions is less than 10 over the 31 year time period. Thus, over one-half 
of the laws listed in Table 1 have been criminally enforced fewer than 10 times in 31 
years. For these crimes, the odds of being prosecuted criminally by the USEPA are 
miniscule. For these 11 case types, the total number of prosecutions over 31 years 
comes to only 37, or 0.108 per year/per law, and only 0.00216 per year/per law/per 
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state. For the remaining 10 laws, there are 547 criminal enforcement cases files, or 
1.765 per year/per law. In neither instance is there a large number of filed cases.  
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of USEPA criminal cases from 1983 
through 2013 by year. Interestingly, Figure 1 illustrates that from 1986 through 2003 (an 
eighteen year consecutive time frame spanning four presidential administrations) the 
USEPA completed fewer than five criminal cases each year. Figure 1 also suggests that 
environmental offending is somehow different that street crime and is not shaped by the 
same factor(s) that contributed to the widely discussed 1990s “crime drop.” That is, 
while official counts of street crime sharply dropped to record declines during the 1990s, 
official counts of USEPA criminal cases during this same time frame fail to illustrate a 
similar distribution. Next we employed USEPA criminal enforcement data to calculate 
deterrence probabilities.  
 The probability of criminal enforcement over this time period must be calculated 
relative to the number of potential offenders or the number of firms that could potentially 
violate an environmental law criminally. Earlier, we estimated that the number of firms 
the USEPA could potentially police was 2,312,368 firms. Thus, we can estimate the 
aggregate likelihood of a criminal prosecution for those firms across time as follow: 
2,312,368 firms times 31 years, divided into 583 criminal cases; or 0.00008% or 8 
chances in 1,000,000. Deterrence probabilities are broken down by year and displayed 
in Table 2. Those data indicate that the deterrence probability related to a case being 
filed against any firm is always less than 1/1,000% (0.0001) in each of the thirty one 
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years examined. As this calculation indicates, the probability of a criminal action for an 
environmental offense is quite low—less than 6 in 10,000 firms at the peak of criminal 
prosecution. Such a threat could only provide deterrence if the perceived threat of 
punishment was extraordinarily magnified over the real threat of punishment. Given that 
corporations are deemed to be rational actors, which is the basis of deterrence in 
theory, such an exaggerated perception of the threat of punishment violates the 
theoretical assumptions of the model, and indicates that the effort to explain the effect of 
punishment on corporations requires a new theoretical grounding since corporations do 
not appear to be perceiving the situation rationally. Earlier, we reviewed Friesen’s 
research, which suggested that 4% of corporate actors are risk lovers. Assuming 
generalizability of Friesen’s sample, of the 2.31 million firms identified earlier, it could be 
inferred that approximately 92,494 (4%) would be classified as “risk lovers.” If we 
assumed that all criminal violations charged in any given year (mean of approximately 
19 cases per year) occurred only among risk lovers, and no other firms violated the law 
in ways that would result in criminal charges, the probability of being charged with a 
criminal violation for risk lovers would still be only 19 per 92,494, or 20.2 per 100,000 
per year (0.00002 per firm), a sufficiently low level of risk that might certainly appeal to 
risk lovers and fail to change their behavior. 
 Alternative estimates can be derived from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 
The U.S. DOJ Environmental Crime Section (2013) website notes that from 1998 
through 2013, it completed criminal cases against 373 corporations and 1,005 
individuals. Following the same method employed above, the 2.31 million firms over 16 
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years would have a 0.00001 probability of having a criminal case finding against them. 
This estimate, while still quite small, is ten times greater than the probability of a 
criminal charge for the entire 31-year time period estimated from USEPA data. The 
difference between the USEPA and DOJ estimates may indicate that by the late 1990s, 
the probability of a criminal case being filed against environmental defendants had 
increased. Despite that increase, however, the likelihood of a criminal charge remains 
small. 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 In part, the potential deterrent effect of these criminal prosecutions may, as 
studies reviewed above suggest, be due to the probability of the most extreme outcome, 
imprisonment, occurring. Data on years of incarceration for DOJ cases from 1998 
through 2013 are available on DOJ’s website. The U.S. DOJ data indicates that in its 
criminal prosecutions, 1,005 individuals were charged and received a total of 729 years 
of incarceration. That’s an average of 8.7 months of incarceration per conviction for 
individuals. In contrast, the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that the average 
prison sentence in the United States for street crime for the same time period was 59 
months, or 6.8 times the average sentence length for an environmental offender (for 
comparisons see Billiet and Roussea 2014). Prior literature has found that that 
environmental crimes have the potential to harm thousands of victims per offense, and 
perhaps hundreds of thousands of victims per offense (Lynch 2013) while street crime 
typically harm slightly more than one victim per offense. Thus, these data seem to 
suggest an inverse association between number of victims and sentence length.  
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Discussion 
 In the preceding sections we have examined the literature on environmental 
crime and deterrence. Prior studies of environmental crime have reported that criminal 
and civil punishments yield significant deterrent effects (Almer and Gosschl 2010; 
Earnhart and Friesen 2013; Gray and Shimshack 2011; Harrington 2013; Shimshack 
and Ward 2005). Theoretically, such effects are expected because rational offenders 
with sufficient information about the threat and likelihood of punishment can be deterred 
from environmental crime when the threats of punishment outweigh the rewards of 
crime. Our analysis of the use of criminal sanctions by the USEPA since 1983 suggests 
that the likelihood of criminal punishment is quite small and that few corporations are 
punished criminally, and that few individuals receive significant penalties such as jail 
time. We also referred to similar data for the surveillance and punishment of street 
crime, which indicated that the likelihood of surveillance and punishment for 
environmental crime is significantly smaller than those likelihoods for street crime. Yet, 
in the literature estimates of the deterrent effects for environmental punishment and 
surveillance are greater than estimates of deterrence for street crime (Shimshack and 
Ward 2005). If the deterrence estimates in the environmental crime literature are 
accurate, they indicate that it takes far less punishment to deter environmental criminals 
than street criminals. Nevertheless, because so few environmental offenders receive 
criminal punishments, criminal punishments have small aggregate effects on 
environmental crime, and producing a meaningful drop in environmental crime through 
criminal enforcement would require extensive commitment of resources by the USEPA 
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for hiring additional investigators, laboratory personnel, legal staff and technicians to 
increase the likelihood of criminal punishments. 
 Prior studies also indicate that while criminal punishments appear to yield 
significant deterrent effects for environmental crimes, they have little impact on the 
volume of pollution generated by polluting industries. Prechel and Zheng (2012) found 
that corporations with high capital dependence had higher pollution rates and that fine 
amounts did not deter pollution. Stretesky and colleagues (2013) employed fixed effects 
regression models to examine within company variations in toxic emissions to assess 
the impact of large monetary fines on toxic releases. The model controls for forms of 
specification error (omitted variable bias) common to other deterrence based 
assessments. Their results showed that large monetary penalties have very small 
deterrent effects on toxic releases. Harrington (2012) found pollution prevention 
practices in the United States have had limited success. In studying the impacts of 
pollution prevention (P2) policies, Harrington found that some P2 threats actually 
increased the likelihood of environmental violations. In a related study, Harrington 
(2013) found that P2 policies designed to decrease toxic emissions were only effective 
when firms were subject to high levels of enforcement, a situation our data suggests is 
not widespread. In a 2007 study, Gray and Shadbegian found that regulatory responses 
to pollution impacted compliance but not emissions (see Gray and Shimshack 2011, for 
an opposing opinion on deterrence and toxic emissions).  
 As noted earlier, some studies in the extant literature suggest that the deterrent 
impact of environmental enforcement is large. Assuming that result is true, one wonders 
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why forty years after the establishment of the USEPA there is any environmental crime 
at all. If environmental enforcement deterred environmental crime at the rates 
suggested in some of the extant literature (e.g., 33%), one would suspect that the 
current volume of environmental crime would be very minimal. Indeed if, as some 
literature suggests, the elasticity for environmental crime deterrence were only 5%, and 
we extrapolated that effect across forty years of the USEPA’s existence, the 
environmental crime rate today should be only about 12.3% of what it was in 1973. This 
is difficult to believe. 
 As noted above, the larger issue is that while the literature suggests that 
environmental enforcement encourages compliance with environmental rules, it has 
little effect on other outcomes such as the volume of pollution. As Stretesky and 
colleagues (2013) argued, these facts indicate that environmental enforcement does 
little to slow the economic treadmill of production and the destruction of the ecosystem. 
Extending that argument, we suggest that it is not the inherent violation of 
environmental law that ought to draw the attention of researchers, or whether the 
enforcement of environmental law deters offenders; rather, greater attention ought to be 
paid to the construction and purpose of environmental law—that is, whether, in its 
current form, environmental laws are stringent enough to protect the environment, 
humans and other species from harm. This is, we suggest, a much different question 
than whether we can construct laws in ways that deter offenders. 
 We draw attention to this issue because deterring offenders by punishing the 
most egregious violators of environmental law does little to address the pressing 
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ecological issues we face in the modern era—the mass destruction of the ecosystem. 
As Stretesky and colleagues (2013) have argued, the enforcement of environmental 
regulations does little to control pollution because it fails to impede production. 
According to the Toxic Release Inventory, in 2011 U.S. manufacturers reported 
generating 22.8 billion pounds of hazardous and toxic waste. There is reason to believe 
that the real total is significantly higher than the volume reported (see, e.g., instances of 
underreporting detailed in Environmental Integrity Project & Galveston-Houston 
Association for Smog Prevention, 2004; United States Government Accounting Office, 
2001). Researchers ought to be concerned not simply with the quantity of illegal waste, 
but with the fact that the law allows too much toxic waste to be emitted legally. It is the 
legal and well as the illegal toxic waste that is the source of the contemporary problem 
of ecological destruction, and the problem is determining when or what level of polluting 
should be considered deviant or criminal. 
 Our point is that the problem of ecological destruction is not one that is confined 
to illegal toxic waste, nor is the problem of ecological destruction one that relates to the 
efficiency of environmental law enforcement’s ability to control illegal toxic waste or to 
deter offenders. Rather, the problem is that the law fails to regulate the constant 
expansionary tendencies of the economic treadmill of production and the vast quantity 
of legal waste being produced. The real problem is that the law accepts the economic 
assumption that continuous economic growth is a reasonable and ecological sound 
assumption. This growth assumption, central to the continuous development of 
capitalism, endangers both ecological and public health, and it is growth of production 
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capacity and capitalism that the law must endeavor to control if the law is to serve as an 
effective mechanism for protecting ecological and public health (Stretesky et al. 2013). 
In addressing this issue, researchers must keep in mind that the traditional focus on the 
deterrent aspects of environmental law and social control harbors a subjective bias that 
preferences growth of production over public and ecological health. In the bigger 
picture, the problem of protecting ecological and public health is not a legal issue but an 
economic issue, one that must be examined from a theoretical orientation capable of 
addressing the nature of harm done to the ecosystem and how that harm prevents the 
ecosystem from reproducing healthy conditions for the maintenance of life (Lynch et al. 
2013). 
Conclusion 
 The literature examining the efficacy of current environmental sanctions includes 
several studies that support deterrence-based crime control strategies. Moreover, the 
Environmental Protection Agency appears to openly rely on deterrence theoretical 
frameworks to guide and justify its responses to environmental harms (USEPA 2013). 
However, data from this study provide reason to give pause when considering this 
approach and its assumptions. In an examination of thirty-one years of USEPA data, 
this study finds that the United States handed about 18 federal criminal cases of 
environmental crimes each year; for a sizable subset (>50%) of this time frame, fewer 
than five criminal cases were handed out annually. Moreover, analyses uncovered five 
different environmental laws for which no criminal investigation has been conducted 
since at least 1983. Those results suggest that there are few criminal prosecutions, and 
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that those few prosecutions are not rationally sufficient to produce deterrence. When 
these figures were considered alongside the number of potential violators and 
opportunities for violation, an estimated likelihood of criminal prosecution of 8 in 
1,000,000 was obtained. By year, we estimated a deterrence probability of less than 6 
in 10,0000 in all years studied. USEPA data also suggests that, on average, those 
charged with environmental crimes serve about 8.7 months behind bars. What this data 
seems to imply, is that the rational offender would continue to violate environmental law 
in pursuit of monetary gain, rather than desist to avert penalty. These findings seem 
contradictory to prior studies that observe large deterrence effects associated with these 
relatively few sanctions. In sum, this study suggests the use of alternate theoretical 
frameworks, and in turn, policy changes, to understand and ultimately put an end to the 
form of environmental degradation associated with adverse environmental 
consequences of corporate behavior. 
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Table 1. USEPA federal criminal environmental cases by law, 1983–
2013 (N = 31 years). 
 
Law                                                             Acronym            Total     Annual Average 
 
1. Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships        APPS                  15        0.5 
2. Clean Air Act                                           CAA                    70        2.3 
3. Clean Water Act CWA 152  4.9 
4. Comprehensive Environmental  
Response & Liability Act                             CERCLA               9        0.3 
5. Emergency Planning & Community  
Right to Know                                              EPCRA                0        0 
6. Endangered Species Act                         ESA                     3        0.1 
7. Federal Facilities & Public Lands            FEDFS/PL           0         0 
8. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
 and Rodenticide Act                                     FIFRA                23       0.7 
9. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act   HMTA                  1       0.0 
10. The International Convention for the  
Prevention of Pollution from Ships                MARPOL            16       0.5 
11. Marine Protection, Research,  
& Sanctuaries Act                                          MPRSA                0       0 
12. Migratory Bird Treaty Act                         MBTA                   7       0.2 
13. Occupational Safety & Health Act           OSHA                   0        0 
14. Oil Pollution Act                                       OPA                      0        0 
15. Other —                                                                               28       0.9 
16. Resource Conservation  
& Recovery Act                                              RCRA                  62      2.0 
17. Rivers and Harbors  
Appropriation Act                                           RHAA                  4         0.1 
18. Safe Drinking Water Act                          SDWA                 4         0.1 
19. Title 18, U.S. Criminal Code —                                           180     5.8 
20. Toxic Substance Control Act                   TSCA                   9        0.3 
 
TOTAL                                                                                         583          18.8	
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Figure 1. USEPA criminal cases by year, 1983–2013. 
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Table 2. Deterrence probabilities by year, USEPA criminal cases, 1983–2013. Year 
Deterrence probability 
 
1983 0.0000035 1999 0.0000047 
1984 0.0000005 2000 0.0000010 
1985 0.0000075 2001 0.0000013 
1986 0.0000000 2002 0.0000018 
1987 0.0000000 2003 0.0000053 
1988 0.0000000 2004 0.0000022 
1989 0.0000000 2005 0.0000048 
1990 0.0000000 2006 0.0000074 
1991 0.0000000 2007 0.0000117 
1992 0.0000000 2008 0.0000121 
1993 0.0000000 2009 0.0000096 
1994 0.0000000 2010 0.0000198 
1995 0.0000000 2011 0.0000204 
1996 0.0000000 2012 0.0000662 
1997 0.0000000 2013 0.0000500 
1998 0.0000000 
 
